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SILENCE IS GOLDEN, UNLESS YOU’RE GETTING BILLED FOR IT: MJS 
LAS CROABAS PROPERTIES, INC. AND PUNISHING LAW FIRMS WHEN 
THEIR ATTORNEYS PROLONG LITIGATION 
MATTHEW HALL* 
“A lawyer with his briefcase can steal more money  
than a hundred men with guns.”1 
I. COLD CALL: AN INTRODUCTION TO 28 U.S.C. § 1927 SANCTIONS 
The notion that a lawyer armed with a briefcase may be a better thief than 
one hundred men with guns, a saying from Mario Puzo’s The Godfather, dates 
back nearly fifty years, but it is a sentiment that persists to this day.2  Lawyers 
are valuable contributors to society, but the public does not always hold the 
profession in high esteem.3  A lawyer can seldom go to a dinner party without 
being told a corny, or perhaps even offensive, lawyer joke.4  Moreover, it is 
almost a requirement for any courtroom drama to feature a corrupt or 
 
*   J.D. Candidate, 2018, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law; M.A. 
2012, Stony Brook University; B.A. 2008, Gettysburg College.  This Note is dedicated to my 
parents, sister, and dog, Lilly, and all of my friends who supported me in my decision to 
attend law school.  I would like to thank my fellow staff writers who have motivated me with 
all of their hard work, and I would particularly like to thank Sam Haggerty, Catrina Shea, 
Chris Reese, Bob Turchick, Lizzie Flanagan, Lauren Anthony, and Valerie Caras for always 
taking the time to offer advice and support throughout the entire process. 
1.  Mario Puzo, The Godfather, G.P. Putnam’s Sons (1969). 
2.  See generally Public Esteem for Military Still High, PEW RES. CTR. (July 11, 2013), 
http://www.pewforum.org/2013/07/11/public-esteem-for-military-still-high 
[https://perma.cc/CW5U-J8YF] (providing data on Americans’ perceptions of several 
occupations); see Leo J. Shapiro, Public Perceptions of Lawyers: Consumer Research 
Findings, SECTION OF LITIG.: AM. BAR ASS’N 1 (April 2002) (providing data on public’s 
views of attorneys).   
 According to a survey conducted by the “Religion and Public Life” section of the PEW 
Research Center, lawyers placed last in a list of occupations where the public was asked to 
rank the extent that each “contribute[d] a lot to society’s well-being.”  See Public Esteem for 
Military Still High, supra (surveying public perception of different occupations).  The survey 
found that 18% of respondents claimed “that lawyers contribute a lot to society,” compared to 
78%, 72%, and 66% for military personnel, teachers, and medical doctors, respectively.  See 
id. (providing survey results).  Further, 34% of respondents claimed “lawyers contribute not 
very much or nothing at all.”  See id. (providing survey results for lawyers).  Additionally, the 
Litigation Section of the American Bar Association (ABA) conducted a survey that collected 
data on the public’s perceptions of lawyers.  See Shapiro, supra, at 2 (surveying public 
perception of lawyers).  This survey found that Americans believe lawyers to be “greedy, 
manipulative, and corrupt.”  See id. at 4 (providing results of survey).   
3.  See generally Shapiro, supra note 2, at 2 (illustrating negative perceptions that 
public holds of attorneys).  For instance, respondents of the survey commented that their own 
experiences with attorneys led to the opinion that attorneys are unethical.  See id. at 9 
(providing reasons for negative perceptions).   
4.  See, e.g., Lawyer Jokes, READER’S DIGEST, http://www.rd.com/jokes/lawyer 
[https://perma.cc/92WV-WPY7] (last visited October Oct. 2, 2016) (“A lawyer e-mailed a 
client: ‘Dear Jennifer: Thought I saw you on the street the other day.  Crossed over to say 
hello, but it wasn’t you, so I went back.  One tenth of an hour: $30.’”). 
1
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incompetent lawyer.5  Although these portrayals in the media and pop-culture 
are often exaggerated, they nevertheless reflect the public sentiment that law is 
not the most ethical profession.6 
Although lawyers often get a bad rap, it is not always without merit.7  They 
sometimes do unethical and unprofessional things.8  They lie.9  They bill for 
hours they didn’t earn.10  They post pictures of themselves on Facebook holding 
a shotgun with the captions like this: “You should take the plea.”11  With these 
bad apples out there, it is no wonder that the public questions attorneys’ 
morals.12  However, the legal community is not without hope.13 
In response to, or perhaps in anticipation of, attorney misconduct and the 
negative light it casts on the profession as a whole, the legal institution has 
taken measures to increase professionalism and competence among attorneys.14  
 
5.  See, e.g., THE FIRM (Davis Entertainment 1993); BETTER CALL SAUL (High Bridge 
Productions 2015); MAKING A MURDERER (Netflix 2015). 
6.  For examples of behavior that reflect public perception of lawyers, see supra notes 
2-5 and accompanying text. 
7.  For a discussion of public perceptions of attorneys, see supra notes 2–5 and 
accompanying text. 
8.  See, e.g., 2014 Survey on Lawyer Discipline System, AM. BAR ASS’N CENTER FOR 
PROF. RESP. (Jan. 2016), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/professional_responsibility/2014
_sold_final_results.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/3T6K-57FD] (providing data on 
attorney sanctions throughout United States).  In 2014, a total of 88,930 complaints were 
made to state disciplinary committees concerning attorney misconduct.  See id. at 5 (providing 
sanction data). 
9.  See, e.g., Joe Patrice, Lawyer Who Lied About His Mom Dying . . .  Allegedly Lied 
Again TO THE SAME JUDGE, ABOVE THE LAW (Apr. 18, 2016), 
http://abovethelaw.com/2016/04/lawyer-who-lied-about-his-mom-dying-allegedly-lied-again-
to-the-same-judge [https://perma.cc/T8YG-D6PJ] (describing case in which lawyer lied to 
judge to receive extension). 
10.  See, e.g., Elie Mystal, When I Get That Feeling, I Want Sexual Billing, ABOVE THE 
LAW (Jan. 15, 2013), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/01/when-i-get-that-feeling-i-want-sexual-
billing [https://perma.cc/6DNU-XMVZ] (describing case where lawyer billed client for sex); 
Kathryn Rubino, Lawyer Sent Fake Bills to Company for 14 Years. Lesson: Check Yo Bills, 
ABOVE THE LAW (July 25, 2016), http://abovethelaw.com/2016/07/lawyer-sent-fake-bills-to-
company-for-14-years-lesson-check-yo-bills [https://perma.cc/7AXL-RA53] (describing case 
where lawyer sent fake bills to his employer). 
11.  See Joe Patrice, DA Brandishes Shotgun in Facebook Picture Captioned, ‘You 
Should Take The Plea’, ABOVE THE LAW (Aug. 3, 2015), http://abovethelaw.com/2015/08/da-
brandishes-shotgun-in-facebook-picture-captioned-you-should-take-the-plea 
[https://perma.cc/JJ2H-3JCT] (describing case where assistant district attorney jokingly 
threatened defendant on social media). 
12.  For a discussion of public perceptions of attorneys, see supra notes 2–5 and 
accompanying text. 
13.  For a discussion of the measures the legal community is taking to fight unethical 
behavior, see infra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
14.  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT preface (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) 
(introducing rules governing attorney professional and ethical conduct).  The ABA initially 
“adopted the original Canons of Professional Ethics” in 1908, a set of guidelines that delineate 
proper attorney conduct.  See id.  (describing history of ethics rules).  In 1969, the ABA 
introduced the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and later in 1983 the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct.  See JAMES E. MOLITERNO, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW 
2
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For example, the American Bar Association founded the Standing Committee 
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility.15  Further, state bar associations 
require practicing attorneys to complete a minimum number of continuing legal 
education (CLE) ethics credits each year.16  The American Bar Association also 
requires law schools to offer a legal professionalism or ethics course.17 
Despite these efforts, however, unethical and unprofessional behavior 
continues to plague the legal profession.18  One particular type of attorney 
misconduct that has received attention in federal courts is covered by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927.19  This statute permits courts to impose sanctions on attorneys that 
“unreasonably and vexatiously” multiply proceedings.20  However, courts 
disagree as to whether the statute holds law firms jointly and severally liable for 
an attorney’s violation of the statute.21  MJS Las Croabas Properties, Inc. v. 
Federal Deposit Institution Corp.,22 the subject of this Note, is the most recent 
 
GOVERNING LAWYERS 19 (4th ed. 2012) (describing updates to Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct).   
15.  See Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/committees_commissions/ethi
csandprofessionalresponsibility.html [https://perma.cc/YEB8-3FKQ] (last visited Sept. 6, 
2016) (providing background on Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional 
Responsibility). 
16.  See, e.g., Pennsylvania MCLE Requirements, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/cle/mandatory_cle/mcle_states/states_p-z/pennsylvania.html 
[https://perma.cc/R7EB-FCS4] (last visited Sept. 6, 2016) (requiring attorneys practicing in 
Pennsylvania to complete two hours of ethics education credits per year). 
17.  See generally ABA Standards and Rules of Procedure for Approval of Law Schools, 
AM. BAR ASS’N 1, 3-46 (2016), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Standards/20
16_2017_aba_standards_and_rules_of_procedure.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/JQ25-
E664] (providing requirements for law schools to become accredited under ABA).  The ABA 
recognizes that professionalism is an issue in the legal field and requires that a law school 
“requires each student to satisfactorily complete . . . one course of at least two credit hours in 
professional responsibility.”  See id. at 16 (explaining requirements set by ABA).  See also 
Lisa G. Lerman, Teaching Ethics in and Outside of Law Schools: What Works and What 
Doesn’t, PROF. LAW. 57, 58 (2006) (surveying obstacles for teaching ethics in law schools).  
Lerman argues that because an ethics course may be the only requirement for upper level 
students, those students may resent it and not take it seriously.  See id. (explaining why 
students may not take ethics courses seriously).  
18.  For data on complaints concerning attorney misconduct, see supra note 8 and 
accompanying text. 
19.  See Joan C. Rogers, Firms Can Be Sanctioned Under Vexatious Litigation Statute, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (Feb. 25, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/search/results/98e7a2cbf938db37ce22fff0e546eb51/documen
t/XDQ15C9G000000?jcsearch=dk%253Abna%2520a0h9n8n1u0#jcite (describing circuit 
split over 28 U.S.C. § 1927). 
20.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (explaining counsel’s liability for excessive costs).  
For a further discussion of the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra notes 38–45 and 
accompanying text. 
21.  For a description of the circuit split over 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra notes 49–84 
and accompanying text. 
22.  545 B.R. 401 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016). 
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decision to contribute to the circuit split.23 
The Bankruptcy Court in MJS Las Croabas held that law firms could be 
held jointly and severally liable for their attorneys’ violations of 28 U.S.C. § 
1927.24  This Note discusses how the court reached that conclusion, and argues 
that a broad interpretation, which includes sanctioning of law firms, will 
promote ethical behavior among attorneys.25  Part II describes the requirements 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and discusses the opinions that created the circuit split.26  
Part III reviews the facts of MJS Las Croabas.27  Part IV describes the court’s 
reasoning in concluding that law firms can be sanctioned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927.28  Part V provides a critical analysis of the opinion in MJS Las Croabas 
and offers a framework as to how both the courts and the legislature should 
approach the statute.29  Finally, Part VI considers the impact of MJS Las 
Croabas and calls for the legislature to amend 28 U.S.C. § 1927 so that the 
statute clearly applies to law firms with the aim of promoting ethical and 
professional behavior.30 
II. THE LINES HAVE GOTTEN CROSSED: VARYING  
INTERPRETATIONS OF 28 U.S.C § 1927 
Attorneys will occasionally go to extreme lengths to delay or prolong 
litigation.31  Consider the case of Holly Gail Crampton, in which Crampton, a 
lawyer, dropped her client’s case after determining that the client would not 
win.32  Crampton, however, neglected to tell either the court or opposing 
counsel about her decision.33  Not knowing that the case was dropped, the 
defendants continued preparing for trial, and they incurred attorneys’ fees as a 
result.34  Crampton’s unprofessional behavior is one of many examples of the 
 
23.  For a complete discussion of the facts of MJS Las Croabas, see infra notes 85–128 
and accompanying text.  For the court’s reasoning, see infra notes 132–64 and accompanying 
text. 
24.  See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 421 (affirming lower court’s ruling that law 
firms can be sanctioned under 28 U.S.C. § 1927). 
25.  For the court’s interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra notes 132–64 and 
accompanying text.  For a discussion on how the interpretation can promote ethical conduct 
among practicing attorneys, see infra notes 165-214 and accompanying text. 
26.  For a further discussion of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the varying interpretations of the 
statute among the several circuit courts, see infra notes 38–84.  
27.  For a discussion of the facts of MJS Las Croabas, see infra notes 85–128 and 
accompanying text. 
28.  For a description of the court’s analysis in MJS Las Croabas, see infra notes 132–
64 and accompanying text. 
29.  For a critical analysis of the interpretation of 28 U.S.C § 1927, see infra notes 165–
214 and accompanying text. 
30.  For a discussion on the impact of MJS Las Croabas on attorney conduct, see infra 
notes 199–210 and accompanying text. 
31.  For examples of attorneys prolonging litigation, see infra note 45 and 
accompanying text. 
32.  See Edwards v. General Motors Corp., 153 F.3d 242, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(providing background of case). 
33.  See id. 
34.  See id. (providing background of case). 
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type of conduct that 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is meant to cover.35  However, courts 
disagree on who or what can be punished under the statute.36  While some 
courts restrict the statute’s reach to only individual attorneys, like Crampton, 
others take a broader interpretation and apply it to attorneys and law firms 
alike.37 
28 U.S.C. § 1927 was enacted to deter “intentional and unnecessary 
delay[s] in the proceedings.”38  It provides: 
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of 
the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the 
proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be 
required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, 
and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.39 
Although the language of the statute can confuse even the sharpest of 
minds, it essentially punishes attorneys who unnecessarily prolong a case by 
requiring them to pay for any costs that the other party incurred as a result of 
their conduct.40  The statute is intended to target conduct that disrespects both 
the court and the attorney’s duties to the legal profession.41 
To be held liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the attorney must be more than 
careless or incompetent.42  Some circuit courts require a showing of bad faith.43  
Others ask whether the conduct had the end effect of “harassing” or “annoying,” 
 
35.  For examples of sanctionable conduct in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra 
note 45 and accompanying text. 
36.  For a discussion on how courts disagree as to who can be sanctioned under 28 
U.S.C. § 1927, see infra notes 49–84 and accompanying text. 
37.  For a discussion on how courts disagree as to who can be sanctioned under 28 
U.S.C. § 1927, see infra notes 49–84 and accompanying text. 
38.  See Beatrice Foods Co. v. New Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d 1171, 
1177 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1927). 
39.  28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (explaining counsel’s liability for excessive costs). 
40.  See Douglas Pepe, Persuading Courts to Impose Sanctions on Your Adversary, 6 
AM. BAR ASS’N SEC. LITIG. 1, 2 (2010) (describing 28 U.S.C. § 1927 violations as consisting 
of “basically any conduct that prolongs the case and causes additional expense and delay”).  
While the purpose of the statute is meant to deter attorneys from delaying litigation, a “strict 
construction is necessary so that the provision will in no way dampen the legitimate zeal of an 
attorney in representing his or her client.”  See Janet Eve Josselyn, The Song of Sirens—
Sanctioning Lawyers Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 31 B.C. L. REV. 477, 480 (1990) (describing 
purpose of statute). 
41.  See Jensen v. Phillips Screw Co., 546 F.3d 59, 64 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[A]n attorney’s 
actions must evince a studied disregard of the need for an orderly judicial process . . . , or add 
up to a reckless breach of the lawyer’s obligations as an officer of the court.”) (citations 
omitted). 
42.  See Jensen, 546 F.3d at 64 (“Garden-variety carelessness or even incompetence, 
without more, will not suffice to ground the imposition of sanctions under section 1927.”).  
Although not all courts require bad faith to show a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, such a 
showing is typically sufficient.  See id. (explaining bad faith as sufficient to satisfy 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927). 
43.  See, e.g., New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir. 
1989) (noting requirement of subjective bad faith when imposing 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions). 
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and an attorney’s intentions are irrelevant to this analysis.44  Examples of 
sanctionable conduct under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 include filing the same complaint 
multiple times and making unnecessary discovery requests.45 
Although the specific conduct covered by the statute has been clarified, the 
answer to “who” or “what” is liable is not as clear.46  Several circuit courts 
argue that 28 U.S.C. § 1927 applies only to individuals, and that law firms do 
not qualify as “individuals” within the meaning of the statute.47  Other courts, 
by contrast, apply 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to both attorneys and the law firms where 
they work.48 
A. Sent Straight to Voicemail: Courts That Do Not Apply  
28 U.S.C. § 1927 to Law Firms 
The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all refused to apply 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927 to law firms.49  In BDT Productions, Inc. v. Lexmark International, 
Inc.,50 the Sixth Circuit reversed the District Court of Eastern Kentucky, which 
had imposed 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions against the law firm Meisenheimer 
 
44.  See, e.g., Cruz v. Savage, 896 F.2d 626, 632 (1st Cir. 1990) (“Behavior is 
‘vexatious’ when it is harassing or annoying, regardless of whether it is intended to be so.”). 
45.  See Pepe, supra note 40, at 3 (providing examples of sanctionable conduct under 
28 U.S.C. § 1927).  As another example, the defendants in Siderpali, S.P.A. v. Judal 
Industries, Inc. were sanctioned for re-filing a motion that had already been denied by the 
court.  See Siderpali, S.P.A. v. Judal Industries, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1023, 1028 (S.D.N.Y 1993) 
(determining re-filing of previously denied motion was sanctionable).  The attorneys in 
Kotsilieris v. Chalmers were sanctioned for requesting a jury the night before the trial was 
scheduled to commence.  See Kotsilieris v. Chalmers, 966 F.2d 1181, 1183 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(requesting jury night before trial was sanctionable).  
46.  For a discussion of the circuit split, see infra notes 49–84 and accompanying text. 
47.  See, e.g., Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1294–95 (9th Cir. 
2015) (holding law firms excluded from 28 U.S.C. § 1927); BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark 
Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 751 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Even if firms can admittedly be personified in 
a literary sense through briefs, there is no reason to consider a law firm a ‘person’ under the 
statute.”); FM Indus., Inc. v. Citicorp Credit Servs., Inc., 614 F.3d 335, 340 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(“Liability under § 1927 is direct, not vicarious.”); Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel Indus., Inc., 556 
F.3d 389, 395 n.6 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[Section] 1927 does not authorize the imposition of 
sanctions on a represented party, nor does it authorize the imposition of sanctions on a law 
firm.”); Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 722–24 (7th Cir. 2005) (interpreting “other 
person admitted to conduct cases” language of statute). 
48.  See, e.g., Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(“[N]othing in the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, . . leads us to think that the District Court 
was without authority to impose sanctions on Arnold & Itkin as a whole.”); Smith v. Grand 
Bank & Tr. of Fla., 193 F. App’x. 833, 838 (11th Cir. 2006) (agreeing that 28 U.S.C. § 1927 
applies to law firms); Lee v. First Lenders Ins. Servs., Inc., 236 F.3d 443, 446 (8th Cir. 2001) 
(affirming 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions against law firm); LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 
146 F.3d 899, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (affirming district court ruling that law firm was liable for 
expenses incurred due to vexatious and unreasonable multiplication of proceedings); Baker 
Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1985) (affirming 28 U.S.C. § 1927 
sanctions against Cravath law firm). 
49.  For a sample of cases that did not hold law firms liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see 
supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
50.  602 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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Herron & Steel (Meisenheimer).51  The law firm was initially sanctioned for 
filing a frivolous claim.52  In reversing the district court’s sanctions against 
Meisenheimer, the circuit court explained that a law firm is not a “person” as 
required by the statute, nor is a firm “admitted” to appear before the court.53 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit judge in Claiborne v. Wisdom54 reversed the 
district court’s ruling that a law firm can be sanctioned because one of its 
attorneys filed a baseless claim.55  Similar to the Sixth Circuit’s reasoning, the 
Seventh Circuit concluded that only individuals are admitted to practice law, 
and law firms are not “individuals” under the statute.56  Further, the Seventh 
Circuit asserted that the language “other person admitted to conduct cases” does 
not apply to law firms, but instead, includes only other non-attorney 
individuals.57 
In addition to BDT and Claiborne, the Ninth Circuit in Kaass Law v. Wells 
Fargo Bank, N.A.58 reversed the district court’s sanctions against the law firm.59  
 
51.  See id. at 743–44, 751 (holding law firms cannot be sanctioned under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927).  
52.  See id. at 749–50 (providing background of case). The plaintiff, BDT Products, 
alleged that the defendant, Lexmark, had stolen its design for a printer tray.  See id. at 743 
(explaining plaintiff’s argument).  The court, however, found that the design was not 
proprietary as it was previously released to the public.  See id. at 749 (finding design was not 
proprietary).  As a result, the district court sanctioned BDT’s law firm, Meisenheimer Herron 
& Steel, for bringing “a lawsuit that should never have been brought, and in which no attorney 
should have persisted.”  See id. (explaining court sanctions imposed on law firm) (citation 
omitted).  
53.  See id. at 751 (“Even if firms can admittedly be personified in a literary sense 
through briefs, there is no reason to consider a law firm a ‘person’ under the statute.  More 
importantly, law firms are not ‘admitted’ to ‘conduct cases’ in court.”). 
54.  414 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2005). 
55.  See id. at 717–18, 720, 724 (providing factual background).  The plaintiff, Toni 
Claiborne, alleged that she was wrongfully evicted from her apartment after turning down the 
building manager’s sexual advances.  See id. at 717 (describing plaintiff’s claim).  Claiborne’s 
complaint asserted that the defendant engaged in similar conduct with other women, and that 
both her and her lawyer, Boyd, interviewed those women to support her claim.  See id. at 718 
(explaining plaintiff’s complaint).  However, those women later denied ever corroborating 
Claiborne’s story, and Claiborne subsequently filed a motion to dismiss.  See id. (indicating 
factors that led to plaintiff’s motion to dismiss).  In response to Claiborne’s allegations, which 
were not supported by factual evidence, the district court sanctioned Claiborne, Boyd, and 
Boyd’s law firm for vexatiously and unreasonably multiplying the proceedings.  See id at 718, 
722. (sanctioning law firm). 
56.  See id. at 723 (“Individual lawyers, not firms, are admitted to practice before both 
the state courts and the federal courts.” (citations omitted)). 
57.  See id. (interpreting meaning of statute).  The court argued that the term “other 
person” is limited to non-attorney individuals that may appear before the court.  See id. 
(noting court’s interpretation of “other person”).  The court refers to both the Code of Federal 
Regulations and the Indiana Rules of Court.  See id. (citing 37 C.F.R. § 10.14; IND. R. CT. 
2.1). (referring to statutes that permit non-attorneys to appear before court).  37 C.F.R. § 10.14 
permits certain non-attorneys to participate in patent proceedings, while IND. R. CT. 2.1 
permits “supervised law students to act as attorneys.”  See id. (comparing 37 C.F.R. § 10.14 
and IND. R. CT. 2.1).  The court refused to extend the meaning of other person to law firms, 
claiming that to do so would be “too much of a stretch.”  See id. (noting court’s reasoning for 
limiting its interpretation of “other person”).  
58.  799 F.3d 1290 (9th Cir. 2015).  
7
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Comparing 28 U.S.C. § 1927 with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the court concluded that the legislature could not have intended for 
28 U.S.C. § 1927 to apply to law firms because Rule 11 explicitly mentions 
“law firm[s].”60  If the legislature intended 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to apply to law 
firms, the words “law firms” would have been included in the statute.61 
B. Taking the Call: Courts That Do Apply  
28 U.S.C. § 1927 to Law Firms 
In contrast to the abovementioned courts, the Second, Third, Eighth, 
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits take the opposing viewpoint, holding that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927 does apply to law firms.62  Additionally, the First Circuit has implicitly 
held law firms liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.63  Finally, the Southern District of 
New York has imposed 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions against a law firm, a 
decision the MJS Las Croabas court finds persuasive.64 
In Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp.,65 the Second Circuit affirmed the 
Southern District of New York’s 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions against the Arnold 
& Itkin law firm.66  The Second Circuit held that district courts have wide 
 
59.  See id. at 1295 (reversing district court).  Wells Fargo argued that Kaass Law 
“multipl[ied] the proceedings” by (1) “fail[ing] to differentiate Wells Fargo from the other 
defendants,” (2) “failing to communicate its intent to file a motion for leave to amend, and 
then filing a motion for leave to amend the day after Wells Fargo filed a motion to dismiss[,]” 
(3) “failing to oppose Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss[,]” and (4) “filing . . . ‘boilerplate’ 
complaints” that were not specific to the current issue.  See id. at 1292 (explaining defendant’s 
legal argument).  The district court imposed sanctions against Kaass Law in the amount of 
$8,480.  See id. (noting monetary amount of fine imposed on law firm).  
60.  See id. at 1294–95 (describing and differentiating FED. R. CIV. P. 11 from 28 
U.S.C. § 1927). 
61.  See id. (comparing 28 U.S.C. to § 1927 to FED. R. CIV. P. 11).  The court applies 
the doctrine of “expressio unius.”  See id. at 1294 (interpreting statute).  Expressio unius 
stands for the proposition that anything mentioned in the statute is covered whereas anything 
not mentioned is excluded.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory 
State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 455 (1989).  The court further reasoned that the language of 
§ 1927 is specific enough to justify the interpretation that law firms were not considered under 
the statute—the legislature would not have written the statute with such “specificity” if it 
intended for it to apply to a larger class.  See Kaass, 799 F.3d at 1294 (citation omitted) 
(noting why law firms do not fall under statute’s umbrella). 
62.  For a sample of cases that extended liability under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to law firms, 
see supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
63.  For a discussion of the First Circuit’s implicit sanctions against a law firm under 28 
U.S.C. § 1927, see infra notes 152–56 and accompanying text. 
64.  For a discussion of the Southern District of New York’s imposition of sanctions 
against a law firm, see infra notes 81–84 and accompanying text. 
65.  675 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2012). 
66.  See id. at 149 (affirming district court’s holding).  In April 2006, Michael Enmon 
attempted to finance an acquisition of a piping company by applying for a loan from Prospect.  
See id. at 140 (explaining facts of case).  As part of the application, Enmon signed an 
arbitration agreement that required all disputes to be resolved through binding arbitration in 
New York.  See id. (explaining facts of case).  However, Prospect ultimately denied Enmon’s 
loan application.  See id. at 141 (explaining facts of case).  In September 2006, the attorney 
who represented Enmon in the failed transaction, Robert Fiser, sued Enmon for unpaid legal 
fees.  See id. at 141 (explaining plaintiff’s allegations).  At this time, Enmon was represented 
8
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 6 [2018], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss6/3
2017] NOTE 49 
discretion when imposing sanctions.67  The court also noted a “long-standing 
practice” of sanctioning law firms pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and deemed it 
unnecessary to change this tradition.68  Finally, the court held that the individual 
attorney’s actions were “indistinguishable” from those of the law firm, and 
therefore it was appropriate to sanction the law firm as a whole.69 
Other circuit courts have implicitly imposed sanctions against law firms 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927.70  For instance, the Third Circuit in Baker 
Industry, Inc. v. Cerberus Ltd.71 affirmed the district court’s sanctions against 
the Cravath, Swaine, and Moore law firm.72  The Eighth Circuit in Lee v. First 
Lenders Institution Services, Inc.73 similarly affirmed sanctions against the 
plaintiff’s law firm.74  Lastly, the First Circuit in Jensen v. Phillips Screw Co.75 
implicitly affirmed sanctions against a law firm when it remanded the case back 
to the district court on matters unrelated to the sanction.76 
Further, while the Eleventh Circuit in Smith v. Grand Bank & Trust of 
Florida77 did not issue sanctions to the attorney nor the law firm, it nevertheless 
analyzed whether or not the law firm should be sanctioned.78  In refusing to 
extend the sanctions to the law firm, the court reasoned that Scott Behren was 
 
by Jason Itkin, a partner at the Arnold & Itkin law firm.  See id. (indicating defendant’s 
representation).  Itkin subsequently filed claims against Prospect.  See id. (noting defendant’s 
claims against third party).  In response to Itkin’s claims, Prospect filed for arbitration in New 
York, as agreed upon in the arbitration agreement.  See id. (noting why case was filed in New 
York).  Itkin notified Prospect that he was filing a temporary restraining order in Texas state 
court to stay the arbitration proceedings.  See id. (explaining facts of case).  Prospect filed a 
similar order in the Southern District of New York.  See id. (explaining facts of case).  
However, Itkin failed to notify the Texas state court that an order was filed in New York 
federal court.  See id. (indicating defendant’s failed actions).  The district court imposed 
sanctions against Arnold & Itkin for filing the order in bad faith.  See id. at 143–44 
(sanctioning law firm). 
67.  See id. at 147 (asserting that courts possess inherent power to impose sanctions, 
and that power applies to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions). 
68.  See id. (citing prior district court cases that sanction law firms under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927).  See, e.g., Reichmann v. Neumann, 553 F. Supp. 2d 307, 319–26 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) 
(sanctioning law firm for repeatedly altering arguments when confronted with unfavorable 
facts); ACLI Gov’t Sec., Inc. v. Rhoades, 907 F. Supp. 66, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (sanctioning 
law firm for filing baseless claim). 
69.  See Enmon, 675 F.3d at 148 (“The District Court . . . properly attributed the actions 
of Jason Itkin to the entire firm. . . . Throughout the litigation, Itkin’s actions were 
indistinguishable from those of Arnold & Itkin as a firm.”). 
70.  For a discussion of cases that implicitly imposed 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra notes 
71–84 and accompanying text. 
71.  764 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1985). 
72.  See id. at 212 (affirming sanctions imposed by district court on law firm pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1927). 
73.  236 F.3d 443 (8th Cir. 2001). 
74.  See id. at 445 (affirming district court’s sanctions imposed on law firm pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. § 1927). 
75.  546 F.3d 59 (1st Cir. 2008). 
76.  For a discussion of Jensen, see infra notes 153–55 and accompanying text. 
77.  193 F. App’x. 833 (11th Cir. 2006). 
78.  See id. at 838–39 (determining whether law firm should be sanctioned).  The circuit 
court explicitly declared that 28 U.S.C. § 1927 applies to law firms.  See id. at 838 
(“[Plaintiff] correctly argues that § 1927 allows for sanctions against a law firm.”). 
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the only attorney at his law firm who worked on the case, and if anyone were to 
be sanctioned in this case, it would be him.79  However, the court did 
acknowledge that law firms can be sanctioned under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for 
“vexatiously and unreasonably” multiplying the proceedings.80 
A final example, Brignoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc.,81 comes from 
the Southern District of New York.82  The court in Brignoli found that law firms 
are “other person[s] admitted to conduct cases” and therefore can be sanctioned 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.83  Although the case was decided in a district court 
within the First Circuit, the MJS Las Croabas court found Brignoli’s reasoning 
persuasive.84 
III. GETTING A BUSY SIGNAL: AN ATTORNEY’S UNRESPONSIVENESS  
LEADS TO A LONG PROCEEDING 
In MJS Las Croabas, one attorney’s unresponsiveness caused opposing 
counsel to incur expenses that could have been avoided.85  The relevant parties 
to this case include (1) MJS Las Croabas Properties, Inc. (MJS), (2) the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Company (FDIC), (3) Trigild, Inc. (Trigild), (4) the trustee, 
Mr. Wilfredo Segarra Miranda, and (5) the Homeowners Association (HOA).86  
 
79.  See id. (ruling that law firm is not liable).  The attorney in this case, Behren, filed a 
frivolous claim in bad faith.  See id. at 837 (discussing facts of case).  However, the court 
determined that the attorney’s conduct did not multiply the proceedings.  See id. at 838 
(discussing holding of case).  In refusing to sanction Behren’s law firm, the court considered 
the following factors: (1) Behren was the only attorney who was assigned to the case and (2) 
he was fired during the case.  See id. at 838–39 (discussing factors to consider for determining 
sanction violation).  Although the law firm signed the pleadings and paid for the filing fees, 
the court did not consider this conduct enough to outweigh the other factors.  See id. (finding 
that sanctions were not appropriate).  
80.  See id. at 838 (noting that law firms can be sanctioned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927). 
81.  735 F. Supp. 100, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (sanctioning law firm under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927). 
82.  See id. at 100 (explaining procedural history).  
83.  See id. at 102 (holding law firms as “other person[s] admitted to conduct cases” 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1927) (citation omitted).  
84.  For a discussion of how the MJS Las Croabas court applied the reasoning from 
Brignoli, see infra notes 143–48 and accompanying text. 
85.  For a discussion of how the attorney’s unresponsiveness caused opposing counsel 
to incur expenses, see infra notes 95–128 and accompanying text. 
86.  See MJS Las Croabas Props., Inc. v. FDIC, 545 B.R. 401, 404 n.1 & 3–4 (B.A.P. 
1st Cir. 2016) (noting relevant parties).  MJS is a real estate company established in 2004.  See 
id. at 405 n.3 (noting relevant parties).  MJS built residential units in a development called 
“The Ocean Club at Seven Seas.”  See id. (discussing facts of case).  MJS owed FDIC $20 
million.  See id. (discussing facts of case).  As per protocol under a Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
case, the court appointed Trigild as a receiver and Mr. Segarra Miranda as trustee.  See id. 
(identifying trustee).  A receiver is “appointed by a judge to take [control of a 
debtor’s] . . . property.”  See Receiver, NOLO’S PLAIN-ENGLISH LAW DICTIONARY 
https://www.nolo.com/dictionary/receiver-term.html [https://perma.cc/A8PV-3LLU] (last 
visited Sept. 7, 2016) (defining receiver).  Finally, HOA was both a creditor to MJS and the 
administrator of “The Ocean Club at Seven Seas.”  See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 405 n.6 
(describing relevant parties). 
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Ms. Anabelle Quiñones-Rodriguez, an attorney for the Castellanos & Gierbolini 
(Castellanos) law firm, served as counsel for HOA.87  Finally, Mr. Manuel 
Fernández-Bared, Mr. Brian M. Dick-Biascoechea, and Mr. Jeffrey Sandell 
served as counsel for FDIC.88 
On July 19, 2012, MJS filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.89  The case was 
subsequently changed to a Chapter 7 case, and Mr. Segarra Miranda was named 
the trustee.90  In response to the MJS bankruptcy, Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez filed 
a motion for relief from stay on August 14, 2014.91  Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez 
filed the motion on behalf of HOA, who was trying to recover damages for 
construction defects at The Ocean Club at Seven Seas.92  HOA managed The 
Ocean Club at Seven Seas, and it alleged that MJS was responsible for the 
defects.93 
On August 15, 2014, the judge summoned FDIC and one of HOA’s 
creditors, and also scheduled a hearing for September 9, 2014.94  After receiving 
the summons, Mr. Fernández-Bared, counsel for FDIC, called Ms. Quiñones-
Rodriguez several times to resolve the matter before the hearing.95  Ms. 
Quiñones-Rodriguez did not respond to nor return any of the calls.96  Trigild 
 
87.  See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 405 (describing Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s 
relationship with Castellano law firm).  Castellanos & Gierbolini later renamed their firm 
“Castellanos Group Law Firm.”  See id. at 405 n.4 (renaming firm).  
88.  See id. at 405–07 n.8 (listing FDIC counsel).  Mr. Fernández-Bared and Mr. Dick-
Biascoechea were local counsel for FDIC.  See id. at 405-07 (listing local counsel).  Mr. 
Sandell also represented FDIC and was located in Dallas, Texas.  See id. at 406–07 n.8 
(naming Mr. Sandell as counsel for FDIC). 
89.  See id. at 404–05 (noting MJS’s bankruptcy filing).  A business filing for Chapter 
11 bankruptcy proposes a plan to reorganize the business.  See Chapter 11 – Bankruptcy 
Basics, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-
forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/4F2E-
B96J] (last visited Oct. 23, 2016) (describing Chapter 11 bankruptcy).  This reorganization 
allows the business to pay back creditors following an extended schedule.  See id. (describing 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy). 
90.  See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 405 (providing background of case).  When a 
business files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a trustee is appointed to sell any non-exempt assets 
and use the proceeds to repay creditors.  See Chapter 7 - Bankruptcy Basics, UNITED STATES 
COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-7-
bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/7MCM-GZ9L] (last visited Sept. 4, 2016) (describing 
Chapter 7 bankruptcy). 
91.  See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 405 (providing background of case).  In her 
motion, Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez represented herself as an attorney at Castellanos.  See id. 
(discussing representation by Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez).  
92.  See id. (noting HOA allegations against MJS).  
93.  See id. (noting HOA allegations against MJS). 
94.  See id. (describing summons).  A creditor is defined as “one to whom a debt is 
owed.”  See Creditor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (defining “creditor”).  
95.  See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 405 (describing Mr. Fernández-Bared’s 
attempts to contact Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez).  Mr. Fernández-Bared called Ms. Quiñones-
Rodriguez on August 19, 20, and 21.  See id. (discussing facts of case). 
96.  See id. at 405–06 (describing Mr. Fernández-Bared’s attempts to contact Ms. 
Quiñones-Rodriguez).  Each time Mr. Fernández-Bared called Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez, he 
was told that she was not available.  See id. (describing Mr. Fernández-Bared’s attempts to 
contact Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez).  He left a voice message each time.  See id. (describing Mr. 
Fernández-Bared’s attempts to contact Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez).  Albino Acosta, an 
11
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and Mr. Segarra Miranda also attempted to contact Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez, 
but Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez did not respond.97  In light of these failed attempts 
to contact Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez, FDIC, Trigild, and Mr. Segarra Miranda 
requested additional time to respond to the motion.98 
On August 29, 2014, FDIC again attempted to contact Ms. Quiñones-
Rodriguez through another attorney, Mr. Dick-Biascoechea.99  Subsequent to 
leaving a phone message, Mr. Dick-Biascoechea followed up with an email 
urging Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez to respond.100  Again, Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez 
remained silent.101  Trigild’s attorney then emailed Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez on 
September 3, 2014.102  Again, Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez did not respond.103  
Finally, on September 4, 2014, FDIC and Trigild filed an opposition to HOA’s 
motion.104 
At 4:51 PM on September 8, 2014, while Mr. Sandell was en route from 
Dallas to Puerto Rico to attend the hearing scheduled for the following day, Ms. 
Quiñones-Rodriguez filed a motion to withdraw the initial relief motion.105  The 
following morning, counsel for FDIC filed a response requesting that HOA and 
 
administrative assistant at Castellanos, later testified that she answered “most if not all” phone 
calls made to the law firm.  See id. at 409 (introducing assistant’s testimony).  She claimed 
that she did not speak to counsel for the FDIC or Trustee.  See id. (describing Mr. Fernández-
Bared’s attempts to contact Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez). 
97.  See id. at 406 (describing Trigild’s and Trustee’s attempts to contact Ms. Quiñones-
Rodriguez). 
98.  See id. (describing FDIC’s motion to extend).  On August 27, 2014, FDIC 
requested an additional seven days to respond to HOA’s motion.  See id. (describing FDIC’s 
motion to extend).  Trigild and Trustee similarly filed motions to extend on August 28 and 29, 
respectively.  See id. (describing Trigild’s and Trustee’s motions to extend).  All motions were 
granted.  See id. (discussing approval of motions to extend). 
99.  See id. (describing Mr. Dick-Biascoechea’s attempt to contact Ms. Quiñones-
Rodriguez).  Mr. Dick-Biascoechea was told that Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez was “unavailable.”  
See id. (describing Mr. Dick-Biascoechea’s attempt to contact Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez). 
100.  See id. (describing Mr. Dick-Biascoechea’s email to Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez).  
In the email, Mr. Dick-Biascoechea identified himself as the attorney for FDIC.  See id. 
(describing Mr. Dick-Biascoechea’s email to Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez).  He informed Ms. 
Quiñones-Rodriguez that both he and Mr. Fernández-Bared had attempted to contact her, and 
he urged her to respond so that all parties could resolve the conflict as quickly as possible.  
See id. (describing content of Mr. Dick-Biascoechea’s email to Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez). 
101.  See id. (describing Mr. Dick-Biascoechea’s email to Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez). 
102.  See id. (describing Trigild’s email to Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez).  In the email, 
Trigild expressed its concerns over HOA’s motion and asked her to respond before its 
opposition was due.  See id. (describing Trigild’s email to Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez).  
103.  See id. (describing Trigild’s email to Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez). 
104.  See id. (providing FDIC’s opposition to relief motion).  FDIC explained that it 
attempted to contact Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez on several occasions and that she was 
unresponsive to all attempts.  See id. at 407 (providing FDIC’s opposition to relief motion).  
FDIC also claimed that HOA’s motion was improper.  See id. (providing FDIC’s opposition 
to relief motion).  Accordingly, FDIC argued that HOA’s motion for relief should be denied.  
See id.  Trigild also filed an opposition.  See id. (providing Trigild’s opposition to relief 
motion). 
105.  See id. (describing Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s motion to withdraw).  Ms. 
Quiñones-Rodriguez did not explain why the motion was made the night before the hearing, 
nor did she explain why she was withdrawing the motion.  See id. (describing Ms. Quiñones-
Rodriguez’s motion to withdraw). 
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Castellanos reimburse them for all expenses incurred as a result of preparing for 
and travelling to the September 9, 2014 hearing.106  They argued that Ms. 
Quiñones-Rodriguez’s failure to respond resulted in expenses that could have 
been avoided if she simply responded to their calls or emails.107  FDIC also 
asked the court to conduct the September 9, 2014 hearing as scheduled.108 
At the hearing, the judge gave Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez and Castellanos 
time to respond to FDIC’s sanction requests.109  On September 19, 2014, Mr. 
Segarra Miranda joined FDIC’s motion requesting sanctions, arguing that Ms. 
Quiñones-Rodriguez’s failure to respond resulted in “unnecessarily increased 
administrative expenses of the estate.”110  On October 2, 2014, the bankruptcy 
court sanctioned both Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez and Castellanos.111 
HOA immediately filed an opposition to the sanctions and asked the court 
to vacate the order.112  HOA argued: 
(1) [L]aw firms are not responsible for the signatures of their 
attorneys; (2) the imposition of sanctions under § 1927 requires a 
finding of bad faith and vexatious conduct; (3) counsel for the FDIC 
could have appeared telephonically to avoid travel costs; (4) neither 
the FDIC nor [Segarra Miranda] “exhausted” their remedies by 
sending a letter to opposing counsel, “explaining what they 
consider[ed] frivolous”; and (5) “defending or prosecuting a lawsuit” 
was a “valid exercise of its First Amendment rights.”113 
Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez also testified on behalf of HOA, claiming that she 
was an “independent contractor.”114  On October 16, 2014, the court granted the 
motion, vacated the sanctions, and gave FDIC twenty-one days to respond to 
HOA’s opposition.115  The FDIC filed its response on November 6, 2014, 
 
106.  See id. (describing FDIC’s response motion to HOA’s withdrawal). 
107.  See id. (explaining that FDIC counsel was forced to prepare for hearing because 
of Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s unresponsiveness).  Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez explained that the 
law firm was in the process of moving offices and communicating with opposing counsel was 
difficult.  See id. at 407–08 (discussing Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s explanation for being 
unresponsive). 
108.  See id. at 407 (describing FDIC’s response motion to HOA’s withdrawal).   
109.  See id. at 408 (describing September 9, 2014 hearing).  The judge added that if 
FDIC incurred costs because of Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s unresponsiveness, FDIC would 
have to be compensated for those costs.  See id. (describing September 9, 2014 hearing). 
110.  See id. (describing Trustee’s motion to join FDIC).  The Trustee requested that 
Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez be sanctioned and that the court hold HOA’s withdrawal on 
September 8, 2014 “with prejudice.”  See id. (describing Trustee’s motion to join FDIC). 
111.  See id. (describing court’s sanctions of Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez and Castellanos). 
112.  See id. at 409 (describing HOA’s opposition to sanctions).   
113.  Id. (third alteration in original) (describing HOA’s opposition to sanctions).   
114.  See id. (providing Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s testimony).  Ms. Quiñones-
Rodriguez argued that she was not an employee of Castellanos, but an independent contractor.  
See id. (explaining Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s argument).  She claimed she was unaware of 
communication attempts made by opposing counsel or that Mr. Sandell was travelling to the 
hearing.  See id. (providing Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s testimony). 
115.  See id. at 410 (granting HOA’s motion to vacate sanctions). 
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arguing that Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez should be sanctioned for two reasons.116  
FDIC argued that Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez multiplied the proceedings by (1) 
filing a baseless motion and (2) failing to respond to opposing counsel’s calls 
and emails.117 
In March of 2015, the bankruptcy court found Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez 
and the Castellanos law firm “jointly and severally” liable in violation of 28 
U.S.C. § 1927 and ordered them to repay FDIC for all expenses incurred as a 
result of Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s misconduct.118  The bankruptcy court noted 
that attorneys have the duty to resolve conflicts as efficiently as possible, a duty 
that Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez failed to fulfill.119  The court also noted that if 
Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez had conducted a simple inquiry before filing the case, 
she would have discovered that FDIC had a lien over MJS’s assets and that 
FDIC would have priority as a creditor.120 
On April 16, 2015, the Castellanos law firm challenged the sanctions on 
several grounds.121  Nevertheless, the court maintained the sanctions.122  
Castellanos appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Court.123  Most relevant is 
Castellanos’s argument that 28 U.S.C § 1927 does not apply to law firms.124 
The United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the First Circuit affirmed 
the circuit court’s holding.125  The First Circuit bankruptcy court agreed that 
 
116.  See id. at 410, 411 (describing FDIC’s response to vacated order).  FDIC argued: 
  
(1) [T]he Relief Motion lacked support; (2) the HOA failed to respond to 
the FDIC’s efforts to reach an out-of-court resolution of the Relief 
Motion; (3) the HOA failed to notify the FDIC that it planned to file the 
Withdrawal Motion; and (4) the HOA’s counsel behaved in a manner 
inconsistent with the responsibilities of an officer of the court. 
 
Id. 
117.  See id. at 412 (describing FDIC’s argument that HOA should be sanctioned under 
28 U.S.C. § 1927). 
118.  See id. at 413 (holding Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez and Castellanos “jointly and 
severally” liable).  The FDIC requested sanctions in the amount of $11,603.10.  See id. at 
413–14 (describing sanction requests).  This figure represented attorneys’ fees incurred as a 
result of preparing for the relief motion.  See id. at 414 (describing sanction requests).  While 
FDIC actually incurred $17,407.20, it lowered the amount requested to “facilitate the Court’s 
determination of reasonableness.”  See id. (citation omitted) (describing sanction requests). 
119.  See id. (holding that Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez breached professional duty). 
120.  See id. at 411 (“A quick look at the docket would have revealed to the HOA that 
the FDIC–R has a lien over all of the debtor’s assets, covering their entire value.”). 
121.  See id. at 414 (noting Castellanos’s objections to sanctions).  Castellanos argued 
that “law firms are not responsible for the signatures of their attorneys[,]” law firms are not 
liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s conduct did not rise to the level 
of sanctionable conduct under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.  See id. (noting Castellanos’s objections to 
sanctions). 
122.  See id. (affirming sanctions against Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez and Castellanos).  
Before the court affirmed the sanctions, FDIC responded to Castellanos’s objections and 
Castellanos replied to FDIC’s response.  See id. (discussing FDIC’s and Castellanos’s 
objections). 
123.  See id. at 415 (noting appeal to appellate court). 
124.  See id. at 416 (noting Castellanos’s objections to sanctions).   
125.  See id. at 421 (affirming district court’s holding). 
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Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s failure to respond to FDIC, Mr. Segarra Miranda, 
and Trigild, followed by her withdrawal of the relief motion, was “a ‘cavalier 
disregard for both the [c]ourt and h[er] colleagues’ time.”126  The court added 
that Castellanos similarly acted unprofessionally throughout the proceedings.127  
In accordance with this conduct, the appellate panel upheld the sanctions 
against Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez and Castellanos.128 
IV. SERVICE HAS BEEN CANCELLED: SANCTIONING  
QUIÑONES-RODRIGUEZ AND CASTELLANOS 
In affirming the bankruptcy court’s sanctions against both Ms. Quiñones-
Rodriguez and Castellanos, the appellate panel concluded that 28 U.S.C. § 1927 
applies to law firms.129  The court began its analysis with the requirements of 28 
U.S.C. § 1927 and subsequently discussed whether law firms can be held jointly 
and severally liable under the statute.130  After answering the latter question in 
the affirmative, the court found that the sanctions against Ms. Quiñones-
Rodriguez and Castellanos were appropriate.131 
A. Elevator Pitch: The Requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 
After noting that bankruptcy courts in the First Circuit have the power to 
issue sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the First Circuit bankruptcy court 
proceeded to discuss the requirements of the statute.132  First, the party’s 
 
126.  See id. at 422 (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (noting Ms. Quiñones-
Rodriguez’s behavior violated 28 U.S.C. § 1927).  The court added that Ms. Quiñones-
Rodriguez’s unprofessional behavior was exactly the type of conduct that the statute meant to 
deter.  See id. (describing behavior intended to be reprimanded by 28 U.S.C. § 1927). 
127.  See id. (describing Castellanos’s unprofessional behavior throughout 
proceedings). 
128.  See id. at 424 (affirming bankruptcy court’s holding). 
129.  For the court’s analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra notes 132–38 and 
accompanying text. 
130.  For the court’s analysis of whether law firms are liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 
see infra notes 139-56 and accompanying text. 
131.  For a discussion of Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez and Castellanos’s sanctionable 
conduct, see infra notes 157-64 and accompanying text. 
132.  See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 418 (noting split of whether bankruptcy courts 
have power to issue sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927).  28 U.S.C. § 1927 applies to 
attorneys admitted “to conduct cases in any court of the United States.”  See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 
(explaining scope of 28 U.S.C. § 1927).  There has been some debate as to whether a 
bankruptcy court is a “court of the United States.”  See In re Casiello, 333 B.R. 571, 573 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 2005) (stating debate between courts).  Courts cite to 28 U.S.C. § 451 when 
holding that bankruptcy courts are not courts “of the United States.”  See id. at 574 
(distinguishing bankruptcy courts to other courts “of the United States”).  28 U.S.C. § 451 
defines a “court of the United States” as including “the Supreme Court of the United States, 
courts of appeals, district courts.”  Id. (defining “courts of the United States”).  Because 
bankruptcy courts are not explicitly defined in the statute, some courts deny bankruptcy courts 
the authority to issue 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions.  See, e.g., In re Sandoval, 186 B.R. 490, 
496–97 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (following majority view in Ninth Circuit that bankruptcy 
courts are not “courts of the United States”); In re Courtesy Inns, Ltd. Inc., 40 F.3d 1084, 
1086 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that “bankruptcy courts are not within the contemplation of 
15
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conduct must “multipl[y] the proceedings” in such a way that causes some 
delay in reaching a resolution of the case.133  For a party to “multipl[y] the 
proceedings,” the proceeding must have already begun.134  A case cannot be 
“multiplied” if it has not been filed.135  Further, the court explained that 
vexatious conduct must be “harassing or annoying.”136  Finally, while some 
courts require that the attorney act in bad faith, the First Circuit adopted the 
objective standard, which gives courts a great deal of discretion when imposing 
sanctions.137  The judge is expected to use the judge’s experience to determine if 
the attorney’s conduct “falls short of the obligations owed by a member of the 
bar to the court.”138 
 
§ 1927”).  However, district courts in the First Circuit have permitted bankruptcy courts to 
sanction attorneys in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927.  See MJS Las Croabas Props., Inc. v. 
FDIC, 545 B.R. 401, 418 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016) (citations omitted) (noting bankruptcy courts 
are permitted to issue sanctions in First Circuit).  For instance, the Bankruptcy Court for the 
District of Massachusetts, which sits in the First Circuit, issued 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions 
against counsel for failing to respond to discovery requests in a timely fashion and failing to 
appear at examinations.  See In re Lincoln N. Assocs., Ltd. P’ship, 163 B.R. 403, 410–11 
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (sanctioning attorneys for unethical behavior).  Further, the court in In 
re Casiello held that “a bankruptcy court is a court of the United States because it is a unit of 
the district court.”  See In re Casiello, 333 B.R. at 575 (citation omitted) (describing 
bankruptcy court as part of district court system). 
133.  See Beatrice Foods Co. v. New Eng. Printing & Lithographing Co., 899 F.2d 
1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (noting purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is to deter “intentional and 
unnecessary delay in the proceedings”).  Although the MJS Las Croabas court does not 
specifically discuss the Beatrice Foods Co. case in its opinion, Beatrice Foods Co. has been 
cited to set forth the principle purpose of the statute.  See James F. Holderman, Section 1927 
Sanctions and the Split Among the Circuits, 32 AM. BAR ASS’N SEC. LITIG. 44, 45 (2005). 
134.  See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 418–19 (quoting Jensen v. Phillips Screw Co., 
546 F.3d 59, 65 (1st Cir. 2008)) (“In the First Circuit’s view, Congress’s use of the verb 
‘multipl[y]’ in the text of the statute ‘clearly contemplates that, to be sanctionable thereunder, 
conduct must have an effect on an already initiated proceeding.’”). 
135.  See id. (explaining how cases are “multiplied”). 
136.  See id. at 419 (quoting Lamboy-Ortiz v. Ortiz-Velez, 630 F.3d 228, 245 (1st Cir. 
2010)) (explaining meaning of “vexatious” conduct); see also Jensen, 546 F.3d at 64 
(“Garden-variety carelessness or even incompetence, without more, will not suffice to ground 
the imposition of sanctions under section 1927.”).  In Jordan v. City of Detroit, the court 
refused to sanction an attorney who filed a motion to enforce a settlement agreement before 
that agreement was finalized.  See Jordan v. City of Detroit, 595 F. App’x. 486, 487 (6th Cir. 
2014) (describing attorney conduct that was not sanctionable).  The court held that, although 
the attorney was mistaken about the law, it did not rise to the level of “vexatious” behavior.  
See id. at 488 (providing holding of case). 
137.  See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 419 (citation omitted) (noting objective 
standard of review).  The court explained, “[i]n assessing whether an attorney acted 
unreasonably and vexatiously, the First Circuit instructs courts to apply an objective 
standard.”  Id. (citation omitted).  An objective standard asks whether opposing counsel 
incurred costs because of the attorney’s conduct.  See Ardiola Sinaj, Attorneys’ Ability to Pay 
Sanctions Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 15 J. L. SOC’Y 335, 339 (2013–2014) (citation omitted) 
(describing objective and subjective interpretations of 28 U.S.C. § 1927).  This standard is 
different from the subjective view that determines whether the attorney acted in bad faith.  See 
id. (describing subjective interpretation). 
138.  See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 419 (citing Rathbun v. Warren Cty. Schs., 825 
F.2d 977, 984 (6th Cir. 1987)) (describing sanctionable conduct under 28 U.S.C. § 1927).  
16
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B. It’s a Party Line: Holding both Law Firms and Attorneys  
Liable Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 
Following its discussion of the requirements and standard of review of 28 
U.S.C. § 1927, the court analyzed whether the statute encompasses law firms.139  
Acknowledging that nothing in the statute explicitly holds law firms liable, the 
court needed to resolve this “threshold” question.140  To accomplish this task, 
the court looked at how other courts resolved this specific question.141 
Several circuit courts have sanctioned law firms under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.142  
However, the court centered its focus on the reasoning in Brignoli from the 
Southern District of New York.143  Citing the Brignoli court’s reasoning, the 
First Circuit bankruptcy court conceded that when an individual sees the word 
“personally” in the statute, a law firm is not the first thing that comes to 
mind.144  However, because the statute is meant to cover attorney conduct, and 
not client conduct, it is reasonable that the law firms supervising those attorneys 
can also be held liable.145 
Further, the MJS Las Croabas court held that the legislature intended the 
statute to cover “entities who ‘conduct cases.’”146  The court agreed with the 
 
139.  See id. at 419 (introducing question of whether law firms can be sanctioned under 
28 U.S.C. § 1927).  
140.  See id. (“The statute does not explicitly provide for vicarious liability.”).  Law 
firms should be held to the same standard as corporations.  See Ted Schneyer, Professional 
Discipline for Law Firms, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 28 (1991) (arguing that law firms should be 
held liable for attorney conduct).  Under the doctrine of “respondeat superior,” law firms 
would be held liable for attorney conduct just as corporations are liable for the negligence of 
their employees.  See id. (comparing law firm liability to corporations under respondeat 
superior doctrine).  
141.  See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 420 (referring to other court holdings as to 
whether law firms can be held liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927).  
142.  For a discussion of cases that sanctioned law firms under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see 
supra notes 62–84 and accompanying text. 
143.  See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 420 (following reasoning from Brignoli v. 
Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)). 
144.  See id. (citing Brignoli, 735 F. Supp. at 101–02) (describing meaning of word 
“personally” in statute). 
145.  See id. (holding law firms liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927).  According to the 
Brignoli court, law firms “naturally fall” within the category of “other person[s] admitted to 
conduct cases.”  See Brignoli, 735 F. Supp. at 102 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1927).  In Brignoli, 
both an attorney and his law firm were sanctioned under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.  See id. at 101 
(discussing outcome of case).  The court reasoned that because the attorney was a named 
partner of the law firm, and the law firm employed other attorneys who worked on the case, 
sanctions against the law firm were appropriate.  See id. (explaining court’s reasoning).  In 
fact, the court noted that the law firm personified itself in its brief, making statements such as, 
“We have also shown that our positions taken at the time were reasonable.”  See id. at 102 n.2 
(explaining court’s reasoning).  
146.  See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 420 (citation omitted) (describing legislature’s 
intent).  28 U.S.C. § 1927 was enacted to “prevent attorneys from filing multiple suits when 
the matter only required a single proceeding.”  Kevin J. Henderson, When Is an Attorney 
Unreasonable and Vexatious?, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 249, 250 n.5 (1988) (citing 26 
ANNALS OF CONG. 29 (1813)) (describing legislature’s intent for creating 28 U.S.C. § 1927).  
Law firms did not exist when the statute was enacted in 1813.  See GREGORY P. JOSEPH, 
SANCTIONS: THE FEDERAL LAW OF LITIGATION ABUSE § 21(C)(2) (5th ed. 2013) (noting 
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Brignoli court that law firms are “entities who ‘conduct cases.’”147  Because it 
was a basic assumption of courts that law firms are included in the statute, the 
court did not feel the need to explicitly address it.148 
Following its discussion of Brignoli, the First Circuit bankruptcy court 
noted which other circuits have refused to sanction law firms under the 
statute.149  For instance, the Ninth Circuit did not extend 28 U.S.C § 1927 to law 
firms, reasoning that Congress would have explicitly included “law firms” in 
the statute if it were meant to reach them.150  In support of the Ninth Circuit’s 
reasoning, the Seventh Circuit held that only individual attorneys, and not law 
firms, are admitted to conduct cases.151 
Finally, the MJS Las Croabas court turned to an opinion from the First 
Circuit, which implicitly ruled that law firms can be sanctioned under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927.152  In Jensen, the First Circuit Court reviewed a district court’s ruling 
where the law firm was sanctioned.153  The circuit court remanded the case on 
 
absence of law firms when statute was created).  The statute was last amended in 1980.  See 
id.  (providing history of statute).  
147.  See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 421 (citation omitted) (agreeing with Brignoli 
that law firms are persons who conduct cases). 
148.  See id. at 420 (citing Brignoli, 735 F. Supp. at 101–02) (explaining why question 
of whether law firms covered under statute was not explicitly discussed).  Sanctioning law 
firms under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 has only been implicit.  See id. (explaining implicit nature of 
sanctions).  In Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of New York, Inc., the circuit court affirmed § 1927 
sanctions against a law firm.  See Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co. of N.Y., 855 F.2d 1009, 1020 
(2d Cir. 1988) (affirming sanctions against law firm).  In that case, the court examined only 
whether the sanctions were appropriate and not whether law firms were the appropriate target 
of the sanction.  See id. (explaining court’s reasoning to sanction law firm).  Finding that the 
trial court did not err in issuing sanctions, the court implicitly held that law firms can be 
sanctioned under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.  See id. (providing holding of case). 
149.  See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 421 (noting courts that did not issue sanctions 
against law firms).  For a discussion of courts that did not extend 28 U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions 
to law firms, see supra notes 49–61 and accompanying text. 
150.  See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R. at 421 (citing Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1294 (9th Cir. 2015)) (discussing Congress’s intent). 
151.  See id. (citing Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 2005)) (noting 
non-attorney individuals who are admitted to conduct cases). 
152.  See id. (citing Jensen v. Phillips Screw Co., 546 F.3d 59, 68 (1st Cir. 2008)) 
(noting implicit ruling in First Circuit). 
153.  See id. (reviewing district court sanctions against law firm).  In Jensen, the law 
firm Stewart, Estes, & Donnell filed four separate claims against the Phillips Screw Company.  
See Jensen, 546 F.3d at 61 (discussing claims of case).  The law firm accused Phillips of 
manufacturing faulty screws.  See id. (discussing claims of case).  The first claim was 
dismissed because the plaintiff had previously resolved all issues with Phillips.  See id. 
(discussing claims of case).  Stewart, Estes, & Donnell then added a second plaintiff; 
however, that plaintiff ultimately decided not to litigate.  See id. at 62 (discussing claims of 
case).  A third plaintiff was added, but it was subsequently discovered Phillips did not 
manufacture the screw that the plaintiff was using.  See id. (discussing procedural history).  
Finally, Stewart, Estes, & Donnell substituted a fourth plaintiff.  See id. (discussing procedural 
history).  However, after the court inquired about the suitability of this plaintiff, Stewart, 
Estes, & Donnell withdrew its claim.  See id. (discussing procedural history).  Although 28 
U.S.C. § 1927 is not an appropriate sanction for Stewart, Estes, & Donnell’s first complaint 
because the proceeding must have begun, the three subsequent amendments were subject to 
sanctions under the statute.  See id. at 63 (explaining amendments that were subject to 
sanctions).  The trial court sanctioned the law firm Stewart, Estes, & Donnell for multiplying 
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another matter, without addressing the sanctions.154  The MJS Las Croabas 
court reasoned that implicit in the Jensen court’s decision was that 28 U.S.C. § 
1927 applies to law firms because it was not overturned on review.155  In 
affirming the bankruptcy court’s sanctions against Castellanos, the court found 
the Jensen and Brignoli holdings, as well as the holdings from the Second, 
Third, Eighth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, persuasive.156 
C. Time for a Wake-Up Call: Punishing the Unprofessional Behavior  
of Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez and Castellanos 
Because of Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s unresponsiveness to opposing 
counsel, and Castellanos’s failure to act on several occasions, the First Circuit 
bankruptcy court affirmed the lower court’s holding that both Ms. Quiñones-
Rodriguez’s and Castellanos’ unprofessional conduct warranted sanctions under 
28 U.S.C. § 1927.157  Their misconduct caused opposing counsel to incur 
unnecessary expenses.158  The court held that Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s 
“behavior. . . is precisely the type of behavior targeted by § 1927.”159 
In addition to Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez, the court held that Castellanos was 
also responsible for the expenses incurred by opposing counsel.160  Castellanos 
failed to act on several occasions.161  The court found it most surprising that 
Castellanos remained uninvolved even after it was threatened with sanctions.162  
It also rejected Castellanos’s argument that the law firm was unaware of Mr. 
 
the proceedings, and the firm appealed.  See id. (sanctioning law firms).  The appellate court 
held that, considering these facts, the district court may have abused its discretion in 
sanctioning the conduct; however, the court did not hold that law firms fall outside the scope 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1927.  See id. at 67–68 (providing holding of case). 
154.  See MJS Las Croabas, 545 B.R.,at 420–21 (citing Jensen, 546 F.3d at 68) 
(describing that case was remanded without ruling whether law firms can be sanctioned under 
statute). 
155.  See id. (citing that First Circuit courts have implicitly sanctioned law firms under 
28 U.S.C. § 1927).  
156.  See id. (following decisions in Jensen and Second, Third, Eighth, Eleventh, and 
D.C. Circuits). 
157.  See id. at 421–22 (describing bankruptcy court’s holding). 
158.  See id. at 421 (noting expenses incurred from Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s 
misconduct).  Because of Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s unresponsiveness, FDIC, Trustee, and 
Trigild were all forced to prepare oppositions to Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez’s motion, as well as 
prepare for and travel to the hearing.  See id. (describing facts of case).  If Ms. Quiñones-
Rodriguez responded to their phone calls and emails, all of the expenses could have been 
avoided.  See id. (explaining focal problem).  
159.  See id. at 422 (citing Lamboy–Ortiz v. Ortiz–Velez, 630 F.3d 228, 245–46 (1st 
Cir.2010)) (describing type of behavior targeted by 28 U.S.C. § 1927).  
160.  See id. (holding Castellanos “jointly and severally liable” for Ms. Quiñones-
Rodriguez’s behavior). 
161.  See id. (describing Castellanos’s failure to act in response to opposing counsel’s 
actions).  Castellanos “remained silent when confronted with the FDIC’s Response to the 
Withdrawal Motion, the Trustee’s Sanctions Request, the October 2014 Sanctions Orders, and 
the FDIC’s Reply to HOA’s Opposition.”  Id. (describing same). 
162.  See id. (“Even the court’s admonition from the bench at the September 2014 
Hearing that it was inclined to grant the pending requests for sanctions, which included a 
request for sanctions against the Castellanos Firm, did not elicit a response from the firm.”). 
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Sandell’s travel arrangements to Puerto Rico for the September 9, 2014 
hearing.163  Finally, the court was unconvinced that Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez 
was an independent contractor of Castellanos.164 
V. GETTING MIXED SIGNALS: THE LEGISLATURE SAYS ONE  
THING BUT SHOULD HAVE SAID ANOTHER 
Future courts may face a dilemma when confronted with a sanction request 
against a law firm under 28 U.S.C § 1927.165  On the one hand, intuition tells us 
that law firms do not naturally fall within the language of the statute.166  On the 
other hand, intuition also tells us that they should.167  Therefore, until the 
legislature or Supreme Court says otherwise, courts will likely struggle with 
reconciling what they think the legislature intended and what they think the 
legislature should have intended.168  Further, although it is unlikely that 
Congress intended for the statute to apply to law firms, amending the statute to 
include law firms would better serve the purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1927.169 
 
163.  See id. (rejecting argument that Castellanos was unaware that opposing counsel 
was travelling to motion hearing).  
164.  See id. (rejecting argument that Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez was independent 
contractor for Castellanos).  The court noted the following factors to determine if an 
individual is an independent contractor: 
 
[T]he hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the 
product is accomplished . . . ; the skills required; the source of the 
instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the 
relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to 
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired 
party’s discretion over when and how long to work; the method of 
payment; the hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether 
the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the 
hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the 
tax treatment of the hired party. 
 
Id. at 422 n.19 (citing Alberty–Velez v. Corporación de P.R. Para La Difusión Pública, 361 
F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2004)) (listing factors to determine whether someone is independent 
contractor).  Further, Ms. Quiñones-Rodriguez represented herself as an attorney of the 
Castellanos law firm.  See id. (indicating relevant facts in determining holding).  
165.  For a critical analysis of sanctioning law firms under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra 
notes 170–214 and accompanying text. 
166.  For an analysis of why firms are unlikely to be liable under the current language 
of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra notes 170–93 and accompanying text. 
167.  For an analysis of the reason firms should be liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see 
infra notes 195-214 and accompanying text. 
168.  For a critical analysis of sanctioning law firms under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see infra 
notes 170–214 and accompanying text. 
169.  For a discussion of why it is unlikely that law firms are covered by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927, see infra notes 170–93 and accompanying text.  For a discussion of why firms should 
be included in the statute, see infra notes 194–214 and accompanying text. 
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A. Wrong Number: 28 U.S.C. § 1927 Likely  
Does Not Apply to Law Firms 
Courts have an obligation to enforce a statute as the legislature intended.170  
To meet this obligation, courts must determine the legislature’s intent in 
enacting 28 U.S.C. § 1927.171  Although this task may prove to be difficult, 
courts use several methods to determine the legislature’s intent.172 
Legislative intent in the present context helps courts understand whether 
law firms are “person[s] admitted to conduct cases.”173  There are several 
definitions for the word “person.”174  Most relevant is Congress’s definition, 
which states, “[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the 
context indicates otherwise . . . the words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include 
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint 
stock companies, as well as individuals.”175  Therefore, it is a reasonable 
assumption that law firms are considered “persons” under this definition 
because “firms” are explicitly mentioned.176 
Although law firms may be persons according to the legislature, the issue 
remains whether they are persons who are “admitted to conduct cases.”177  State 
bar associations determine who can be admitted to conduct cases.178  Many 
 
170.  See Abner J. Mikva & Eric Lane, An Introduction to Statutory Interpretation and 
the Legislative Process 4 (1997) (“[T]he judicial will must bend to the legislative 
command[.]”).  There are varying theories of how statutes should be interpreted.  See id. at 
50–52 (identifying different theories).  Following a traditional approach, courts may consider 
the text, the legislative history, and canons of construction.  See id. at 50 (considering 
traditional approach).  Following a textualist approach, courts will consider only the text of 
the statute and surrounding statutes, and apply the canons of construction.  See id. at 52 
(considering textualist approach).   
171.  See id. at 4 (describing how courts must determine legislative intent). 
172.  For a discussion of the statutory interpretation methods that courts use in 
determining legislative intent, see infra notes 173–76 and accompanying text. 
173.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (identifying statutory ambiguity).  For a further discussion 
of this issue and the present split among the circuit courts, see supra notes 47–84 and 
accompanying text. 
174.  See, e.g., Person, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (9th ed. 2009) (defining person as 
either “a human being” or “an entity . . . that is recognized by law as having the rights and 
duties of a human being”); Person, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/person [https://perma.cc/5E6C-VSQF] (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2016) (defining person as “a human being”).  Congress includes 
“corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock 
companies, as well as individuals” in its definition of “person.”  1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). 
175.  1 U.S.C. § 1 (explaining definition of “person” established by Congress). 
176.  See Richard Bobholz, Law Firm Choice of Entity, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/tyl/topics/solo-small-firm/law-firm-choice-
entity.html [https://perma.cc/CS67-SWVW] (last visited Oct. 4, 2016) (listing types of law 
firm entities).  Law firms may be formed as corporations, limited liability corporations, S 
corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships.  See id. (identifying law firms’ 
governance structure). 
177.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (applying statute to “persons who conduct cases”). 
178.  See NAT’L CONF. BAR EXAMINERS & AM. BAR ASS’N SEC. OF LEGAL EDUC. & 
ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSIONS REQUIREMENTS 1 
(Erica Moeser & Claire J. Guback eds., 2016), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal_education/Comprehensi
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states require bar applicants to have completed a bachelor’s degree.179  Almost 
all states require the applicant to have a law degree.180  And among those states 
that do not require a law degree, the applicant must still fulfill apprenticeship 
requirements.181  Most notably, the applicant must take—and pass—the bar 
examination.182 
Based on these admission requirements, it is likely that Claiborne and 
similar courts interpreted the statute correctly; law firms are not individuals 
admitted to conduct cases.183  Law firms do not hold a bachelor’s degree.184  
They have not attended law school.185  They have not worked with a judge.186  
And they did not sit for the bar exam.187  If law firms cannot meet the 
requirements to be admitted to the bar, then they cannot be admitted to conduct 
cases.188  Further, even if ambiguity exists as to whether law firms are 
“individuals who conduct cases,” the rule of lenity dictates that the statute be 
construed most favorably to the defendant, which, in this case, would be the law 
firm.189 
 
veGuidetoBarAdmissions/2016_comp_guide.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/7XTD-
GHQ4] [hereinafter GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSIONS] (describing state requirements for bar 
admission). 
179.  See id. at 2 (listing states that require bachelor’s degree to be admitted to state 
bar). 
180.  See id. 8–11 (listing states that require law school diploma to be admitted to state 
bar).  However, some states do not require a formal legal education from a law school.  See 
Sean Patrick Farrell, The Lawyer’s Apprentice, N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/03/education/edlife/how-to-learn-the-law-without-law-
school.html?_r=1 [https://perma.cc/WLE5-56AV].  Among these states are California, 
Wyoming, Vermont, and Virginia.  See id. (identifying states that do not have formal legal 
education requirements).  However, they do require apprenticeships.  See id. (stating 
requirements of states that do not require formal education).  
181.  See Corey Adwar, There’s a Way to Become an Attorney Without Setting Foot in 
Law School, BUS. INSIDER (July 30, 2014, 6:21 PM) http://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-
become-an-attorney-without-law-school-2014-7 [https://perma.cc/ET63-5YTW] (describing 
requirements for bar admissions in states that do not require attending law school).  Those 
who substitute law school for an apprenticeship are known as “law readers.”  See id. 
(explaining common name).  
182.  See GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSIONS, supra note 178 (requiring bar applicants to pass 
exam). 
183.  See Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 2005) (describing 
circumstances when non-attorneys can conduct cases). 
184.  For a discussion of bachelor’s degree requirements, see supra note 180 and 
accompanying text. 
185.  For a discussion of apprenticeship requirements, see supra note 181 and 
accompanying text. 
186.  For a discussion of law degree requirements, see supra notes 180–81 and 
accompanying text. 
187.  For a discussion of bar exam requirements, see supra note 182 and accompanying 
text. 
188.  For discussion of bar admission requirements, see supra notes 178–82 and 
accompanying text. 
189.  See JOSEPH, supra note 146, at 436 (describing rule of lenity).  The rule of lenity 
dictates that statutes be interpreted as narrowly as possible for the benefit of the defendant.  
See William D. Popkin, A Dictionary of Statutory Interpretation 191 (2007) (explaining rule 
of lenity).  The rule also encourages the legislature to draft statutes that place potential 
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If law firms are not “individuals who conduct cases,” the question then 
becomes, to which individuals was the legislature referring?190  As the court in 
Claiborne explained, there are rare circumstances when a law student may 
appear before the court and when non-attorneys appear in patent disputes.191  
Thus, it is possible, if not probable, that the legislature was referring to these 
individuals, and not law firms, when drafting 28 U.S.C. § 1927.192  As a result, 
it is unlikely that law firms are covered by the current language of 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927.193 
B. Adding a Second Line: Law Firms Should Be  
Held Liable Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 
While there may be doubt as to whether law firms really are persons for 
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the decision in MJS Las Croabas represents a 
step in the right direction.194  The two predominant theories for imposing 28 
U.S.C. § 1927 sanctions are (1) to punish and deter misconduct, and (2) to 
compensate opposing counsel for any expenses that they incurred as a result of 
the misconduct.195  Either of these objectives, along with the general purpose of 
imposing sanctions, will be accomplished by holding law firms liable under 28 
U.S.C. § 1927.196  Punishing law firms would incentivize them to monitor 
attorney compliance with ethical standards, thus preventing future 
 
offenders on notice of whether the conduct is wrongful and whether it applies to them.  See 
WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 204 (1999) (describing rule of lenity).  Applying the rule of lenity to 28 
U.S.C. § 1927 would likely absolve law firms from any liability because “persons admitted to 
conduct cases” would be narrowly interpreted to exclude law firms.  See id. at 191.  
190.  For an explanation of why law firms are likely not “individuals who conduct 
cases,” see supra notes 170–89 and accompanying text. 
191.  See Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 723 (7th Cir. 2005) (describing 
circumstances when non-attorneys can conduct cases).  For example, a patent agent is 
admitted to prosecute patent cases.  See Patent Agent FAQ, PATENT LAW AT NOTRE DAME, 
http://patentlaw.nd.edu/patent-agent-and-program-faq [https://perma.cc/N69R-ABMJ] (last 
visited Oct. 2, 2016) (describing patent agents and patent attorneys).  Patent agents differ from 
patent attorneys in that they have not attended law school, nor are they admitted to a state bar.  
See id. (distinguishing patent agents and patent attorneys).  In California, certified students 
can represent clients in trials.  See CAL. R. 9.42(d)(3). 
192.  For a discussion of how courts interpret legislative intent, see supra notes 173–76 
and accompanying text. 
193.  For a discussion of why it is unlikely that law firms are covered by 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927, see supra notes 170–92 and accompanying text.   
194.  For an explanation of why law firms should be held liable under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927, see infra notes 195–214 and accompanying text. 
195.  See Sinaj, supra note 137, at 339 (citation omitted) (describing two different 
interpretations of purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1927).  
196.  See Annotated Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions 1, AM. BAR ASS’N 
(2015) (describing purposes of sanctions).  The purposes of sanctions are “protecting the 
public, upholding the integrity of the legal system, assuring the fair administration of justice, 
and deterring other lawyers from similar misconduct.”  Id. (explaining objectives of statute).  
For lawyers to effectively serve the public, they must earn the public’s trust.  See id. at 5 
(identifying key factors in serving public).  A lawyer who breaches that trust should be 
disciplined.  See id. (explaining disciple for breaching attorney duties).  
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misconduct.197  Law firms are also in a better position to compensate opposing 
counsel.198 
1. Conference Call: Sanctioning Law Firms Will Have a Greater Influence on 
Attorney Behavior 
One view of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is that it is meant to punish and deter 
attorneys from “unreasonably and vexatiously” delaying or prolonging 
proceedings.199  When an individual is punished, the individual is less likely to 
engage in future misconduct because of an increased perception that the 
individual will be caught.200  Similarly, any peers who have observed the 
punishment will be less likely to engage in future misconduct.201  Therefore, if 
an individual attorney is punished for a violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, the 
sanctions will deter both that specific attorney and that attorney’s peers who 
observe the punishment.202 
While sanctioning an individual attorney will affect both that attorney and 
the attorney’s surrounding peers, sanctioning the law firm will have an 
influence on most, if not all, attorneys at the law firm.203  When a law firm is 
sanctioned, it often suffers a loss in reputation and, consequently, a loss of 
business.204  Therefore, the threat of these adverse effects will incentivize law 
firms to adopt a culture that encourages ethical and efficient lawyering.205  By 
 
197.  For a discussion of how sanctions motivate law firms to monitor attorneys, see 
infra notes 204–06 and accompanying text.  
198.  For a discussion of why law firms are in a better position to pay sanctions, see 
infra notes 211–14 and accompanying text. 
199.  For a discussion of the goals of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see supra note 195 and 
accompanying text. 
200.  See Greg Pogarsky & Alex R. Piquero, Can Punishment Encourage Offending? 
Investigating the “Resetting” Effect, 40 J. RES. CRIME AND DELINQ. 95, 97 (2003) (citations 
omitted) (describing effect of individual punishment). 
201.  See Linda Klebe Trevino, The Social Effects of Punishment in Organizations: A 
Justice Perspective, 17 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 647, 650 (1992) (citations omitted) (discussing 
social effect of punishment). 
202.  For a discussion of why punishment deters individuals and their peers, see supra 
notes 200–01 and accompanying text. 
203.  See Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions, 56 STAN. L. REV. 345, 378 (2003) 
(noting that groups can influence and control individual members).  
204.  See Collective Sanctions and Large Law Firm Discipline, 118 HARV. L. REV. 
2336, 2338 (2005) (describing adverse effects of sanctions).  There is a stigma attached to 
sanctions.  See id. (explaining stigma).  Both lawyers and firms will suffer a loss in reputation 
after being sanctioned.  See id. (identifying loss in reputation).  Further, this stigma may create 
a financial loss that manifests when the law firm loses business.  See id. (explaining effects of 
sanctions).  Research suggests that corporations are more concerned with the possibility of 
negative publicity than economic sanctions.  See Schneyer, supra note 140, at 34 (citation 
omitted) (describing negative publicity following sanctions).  This loss in reputation might not 
occur if an individual attorney is sanctioned because the law firm can argue that the unethical 
attorney is not an accurate reflection of the law firm’s ethical standards.  See id. 
(differentiating consequences between sanctioned law firms and attorneys).  
205.  See Levinson, supra note 203, at 349 (describing how collective sanctions 
motivate groups to monitor individuals).  When an entire group is threatened with sanctions, 
the group will change its ethical infrastructure.  See id. (noting effects of sanctions).  Levinson 
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adopting a culture that promotes ethics, as well as implementing an ethical 
infrastructure, law firms will be able to influence the ethical conduct of all 
attorneys at the law firm.206 
In addition to influencing more attorneys at the law firm, holding law firms 
jointly and severally liable has other benefits that will prevent misconduct.207  
First, sanctioning the law firm as a group recognizes the attorney as a member 
of the firm, and identification with the firm will make it more likely that the 
 
explains that changing group norms or introducing ethics initiatives can accomplish this 
change.  See id. (identifying how ethical infrastructure can be corrected).  
206.  See Patrick J. Schlitz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an 
Unhappy, Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession, 52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 910 (1999) 
(describing effect of firm culture on ethical decision-making).  Schlitz argues that law firms 
have a subtle way of getting attorneys to adopt their values.  See id. at 912 (identifying 
lawyers’ reluctance to adopt ethical values).  This shift in values may ultimately lead to 
unethical behavior.  See id. at 915 (explaining how lawyers can become unethical).  For 
example, the pressure of meeting billable hour requirements leads some attorneys to 
manipulate their time sheets.  See id. at 917 (explaining how lawyers may become unethical).  
Further, some argue that law firms may also reward attorneys for engaging in unethical 
behavior and may also represent clients that expect “hyper-aggressive lawyering.”  See Austin 
Sarat, Enactments of Professionalism: A Study of Judges’ and Lawyers’ Accounts of Ethics 
and Civility in Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 809, 827 (1998) (describing ways firm 
culture influences ethical decision-making); see also Elizabeth Chambliss & David B. 
Wilkins, Promoting Effective Ethical Infrastructure in Large Law Firms: A Call for Research 
and Reporting, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 691, 692 (2002) (advocating for ethical infrastructures in 
law firms); Ted Schneyer, supra note 140, at 12 (describing that law firm discipline will 
“supplement” attorney discipline). This effect is illustrated in an example described by 
Schneyer.  See Schneyer, supra note 140, at 2 (citation omitted).  Attorneys in Kirkland & 
Ellis’s Chicago office represented a uranium corporation in an antitrust case.  See id. (citation 
omitted).  Unbeknownst to Kirkland & Ellis’s Chicago office, however, their Washington 
office was representing the American Petroleum Institute, an opposing party to the uranium 
company.  See id. (citation omitted) (explaining conflicts of interest).  The law firm was 
forced to drop the case because of the conflict of interest.  See id. (citation omitted) 
(explaining actions taken to prevent conflicts of interest).  Schneyer attributes the existence of 
the conflict of interest to the law firm’s failure to take measures to detect such conflicts.  See 
id. at 10 (identifying failure in law firm procedures).  If the law firm had a system to detect 
conflicts, then the issue could have been avoided.  See id. (explaining how law firm could 
have prevented conflict of interest). People often know right from wrong, but that does not 
always translate to ethical decision-making.  See generally Charles D. Kerns, Creating and 
Sustaining an Ethical Workplace Culture, 6 GRAZIADIO BUS. REV. (2003), 
https://gbr.pepperdine.edu/2010/08/creating-and-sustaining-an-ethical-workplace-culture 
[https://perma.cc/S46P-S6B2] (finding that some criminals know what right thing to do is but 
do not do it).  The United States Sentencing Commission introduces seven factors for an 
effective corporate ethics program: (1) implementing procedures that detect misconduct, (2) 
educating supervisors on the compliance procedures and ensuring that the guidelines are being 
followed, (3) refraining from hiring individuals with a criminal background, (4) offering 
ethical training programs, (5) monitoring and auditing employee misconduct, determining the 
effectiveness of the compliance program, and making sure that the employees are aware of the 
program, (6) introducing incentives for compliance and punishment to deter noncompliance, 
and (7) punishing those who engage in unethical behavior.  See U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 2011) (listing minimal 
requirements to encourage ethical conduct). 
207.  For a discussion of the additional benefits of sanctioning law firms, see infra notes 
208–14. 
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attorney adopts the firm’s culture and ethics.208  Holding law firms liable will 
also encourage them to fulfill their duty of ensuring that attorneys follow the 
Rules of Professional Conduct.209  Therefore, holding law firms liable under 28 
U.S.C. § 1927 would encourage them to fulfill these duties.210 
2. Paying the Bill: Law Firms Are in a Better Position to Cover Expenses 
A second interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 is that it is meant to 
compensate opposing counsel for unnecessary expenses resulting from an 
opposing attorney’s misconduct.211  Law firms are often in a better position to 
pay these expenses than an individual attorney.212  Holding law firms liable will 
increase the likelihood that the affected attorney will be compensated for 
expenses incurred.213  Therefore, if the purpose of 28 U.S.C. §1927 is to 
compensate opposing counsel, holding law firms liable will better serve this 
purpose because they are in a better position to pay the fines.214 
VI. GET CONGRESS ON THE PHONE: 28 U.S.C. § 1927 SHOULD  
BE AMENDED TO INCLUDE LAW FIRMS 
The circuit split over whether 28 U.S.C. § 1927 applies to law firms 
indicates the need for a quick resolution, and the legislature is in the best 
 
208.  See Milton C. Reagan, Jr., Nested Ethics: A Tale of Two Cultures, 42 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 143, 145 (2013) (citing Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating 
Compliance Through Organizational Values and Culture, 25 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 961, 975, 
978 (2012)) (finding greater identification by employee with company corresponds with 
greater likelihood of following compliance programs). 
209.  See MODEL R. OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 5.1(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2014) (explaining 
effects of professional conduct rules).  Rule 5.1(a) provides that: 
 
A partner in a law firm, and a lawyer who individually or together with 
other lawyers possesses comparable managerial authority in a law firm, 
shall make reasonable efforts to ensure that the firm has in effect 
measures giving reasonable assurance that all lawyers in the firm 
conform to the Rules of Professional Conduct. 
 
Id.  Part of this duty is to facilitate attorney communication with clients and to ensure that 
attorneys engage in efficient legal practices.  See id. r. 3.2 (“A lawyer shall make reasonable 
efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client.”). 
210.  See, e.g., Avner Bar-Ilan & Sacerdote Bruce, The Response of Criminals and 
Non-Criminals to Fines, 47 J. L & ECON. 1, 15 (2004) (finding that monetary fines deter 
drivers from running red lights); Todd L. Cherry, Financial Penalties as an Alternative to 
Criminal Sanction: Evidence from Panel Data, 29 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 450, 456 (2001) 
(arguing that monetary fines are effective alternative to criminal penalties). 
211.  For a discussion of the goals of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, see supra note 195 and 
accompanying text. 
212.  See Schneyer, supra note 140, at 33 (citation omitted) (illustrating that firms are 
more capable of paying fines). 
213.  See Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Punishing the Innocent Along with 
the Guilty: The Economics of Individual Versus Group Punishment, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 81, 86 
(2007) (describing benefits of punishing group instead of individual). 
214.  For a discussion of why law firms are in a better position to pay sanctions, see 
supra notes 211–13 and accompanying text. 
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position to accomplish this feat.215  Regardless of how the statute is ultimately 
interpreted, a uniform interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 will give law firms and 
attorneys the opportunity to predict the consequences of their actions.216  
Inconsistent interpretations of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 will only create confusion 
among law firms and give some an unfair advantage over others.217  This 
unfairness is especially true as sanction requests under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 are 
becoming more common.218 
However, adopting the MJS Las Croabas court’s reasoning would benefit 
the legal profession as a whole.219  Holding law firms liable would likely 
incentivize them to ensure attorney compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1927.220  
Further, law firms are in the best position to monitor and influence attorney 
conduct because attorneys are under their supervision.221  Sanctioning law firms 
would give them the incentive to take advantage of that position and introduce 
an infrastructure that encourages ethical and professional behavior.222  And 
increasing attorney ethics and professionalism would improve the public’s view 
of the legal institution, fostering a more trustworthy and efficient legal 
system.223 
 
215.  For an explanation of why the legislature or Supreme Court must clarify the 
interpretation of the statute, see infra notes 216–18 and accompanying text. 
216.  See Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1584 (2008) 
(citing Evan H. Caminker, Precedent and Prediction: The Forward-Looking Aspects of 
Inferior Court Decision Making, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38–40 (1994)) (explaining that uniform 
interpretation of statutes creates predictability).  
217.  See Daniel J. Meador, A Challenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the 
Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 603, 618 (claiming that 
inconsistent interpretations create confusion).  When the legislature is attempting to control 
future behavior via statute, different interpretations of that statute will undermine the 
objective.  See id. (providing reasoning behind statute).  Further, the different interpretations 
will create unfair results both from a judicial viewpoint and a competitive one.  See id. 
(explaining effects of statute).  Applying this concept to the issue here, a law firm in the Sixth 
Circuit will not be liable for attorney conduct, but a firm in the First Circuit will.  See id.  
(identifying when law firm is liable in First Circuit).  As a result, the Sixth Circuit firm may 
have a competitive advantage over the First Circuit firm.  See id. (distinguishing between First 
and Sixth Circuits).  
218.  See Sinaj, supra note 137, at 345 (describing how 28 U.S.C. § 1927 has become 
substitute for Rule 11).   
219.  For an explanation of why sanctioning law firms under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 would 
improve attorney ethics, see supra notes 203–10 and accompanying text. 
220.  For an explanation of why holding law firms liable under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 will 
likely give them the incentive to promote ethical behavior, see supra notes 204–06 and 
accompanying text. 
221.  For an explanation of why law firms are in the best position to control attorney 
behavior, see supra notes 203–13 and accompanying text. 
222.  For an explanation of why sanctioning law firms under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 would 
give them the incentive to create a better ethical infrastructure, see supra notes 204–08 and 
accompanying text. 
223.  See Piero Mella & Patrizia Gazzola, Ethics Builds Reputation, 1 INT’L J. MKTS. & 
BUS. SYS. 38, 39 (2015) (describing relationship between ethical behavior and reputation). 
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